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IN THE
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgiuia
AT EICHMOND.
Record No. 2890
KEEK P. ALDEIDGE AND KIEK P. ALDEIDGE TEAD-
ING AS ALDEIDGE EIDING STABLES,
Plaintiff in Error-,
versus
PIEDMONT FIEE INSUEANCE COMPANY,
Defendant in Error.
PETITION FOE WEIT OF EEEOE AND
SUPERSEDEAS.
To the Eonorahle, the Chief Justice and the Associate Jus
tices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia:
Your petitioner Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge
trading as Aldridge Eiding Stables, respectfully represents
that he is aggrieved by a final order entered against him in
the Circuit Court of Prince George County, Virginia, on the
28th day of March, 1944., in an action therein pending under
the style of Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge trading
as Aldridge Eiding Stahles v. Piedmont Fire Insurance Com
pany, in which action the amount in controversy is in ex-
2® cess of Three Hundred ®Dollars, exclusive of costs. A
transcript of the record in the action, certified in accord
ance with Eule 21, accompanies this petition, together with the
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original exhibits, certified pursuant to Section 6357 of the
Code of Virginia.
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT.
This action arises out of the loss by fire of the petitioner's
barn, located in Prince George County, Virginia, which barn
was insured by the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company. Ac
tion on the policy was commenced by Notice of Motion for
One Thousand Dollars in the Circuit Court of Prince George
County by Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge trading as
Aldridge Riding Stables against tbe Piedmont Fire Insurance
Company. The insurance company filed its Grounds of De
fense, and in due course^ the action came on for trial before a
jury on March 2, 1944.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to
strike the evidence on the grounds that it disclosed as a mat
ter of law that the policy was unenforceable because the build
ing insured at the time of the fire was and had been vacant
or unoccupied beyond the period of time permitted by tbe
policy. The Court overruled the motion for the time being,
and the defendant then introduced its evidence and at the
close thei-eof the defendant renewed the aforesaid motion to
strike. The Court reserved its decision on the motion and
submitted the case to the jury.
The juiy returned, a verdict for the plaintiff for One Thou
sand Dollars with interest thereon from November 20, 1943,
and thereupon the defendant moved to set aside the ver-
3* diet and included in its motion the ^ grounds assigned in
its motions to strike. And the Court being of the opinion
that the assured barn was vacant and unoccupied, set aside
the verdict of the jury and entered up judgment for the de
fendant on March 28, 1944, to which action the plaintiff ex
cepted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In July, 1942, Kirk P. Aldridge purchased from Estelle L.
Holloway a small farm located in Prince George County, Vir
ginia, for the sum of Thirty-five Hundred Dollars cash, paid
by Mr. Aldridge. Title to the property was placed in the
name of Mr. Aldridge's daughter, Louise Dunford Gibson,
so that she might have a home there. In August, 1942, Mr.
Aldridge, without objection from Mrs. Gibson, erected a barn
on the property at a cost of approximately Twelve Hundred
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Dollars, of which barn he was the sole and unconditional
owner (R., p. 18).
On September 13,1942, Mr. L. W. T. Bulifant, the agent of
the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company, and Mr. Aldridge
discussed the matter of insuring the barn, and Mr. Aldridge
claims that at that time he informed Mr. Bulifant that the
land on which the barn was located belonged to Mrs. Gibson.
Subsequent to that conversation, the agent issued policy No.
1057 in the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company to Mr. Ald
ridge, which policy covered Mr. Aldridge's barn, his horses;
and his riding equipment, but did not cover the dwelling on
the premises. At the trial of the case, a great deal of the
testimony was concerned with the issue of the knowledge of
the agent concerning the ownership of the land, but the ver
dict of the jury clearly established that the agent had such
knowledge.
4^ '^During the second week in June, 1943, Mr. Aldridge
removed his horses and riding equipment, which were in
sured under the policy, because of a misunderstanding with
his daughter about his remarriage. On July 28, 1943, the
barn was destroyed by fire and was a complete loss. At the
time of the fire, the barn was worth approximately Twelve-
Hundred Dollars and would have cost that much to replace.
In due course, Mr. Aldridge filed his claim with the insur
ance company, which claim was refused in December, 1943,
and thereupon action was commenced on the policy by Notice
of Motion for One Thousand Dollars, the maximum amount
of the defendant's liability^ The insurance company filed its
Groi-inds of Defense and amended Grounds of Defense, which
.show that liability was denied on the following grounds: (a)
that the assured was not the sole and unconditional owner;
(b) that the assured had no insurable interest; (c) that there
had been a change in interest, title and possession; (d) that
the assured did not own the ground in fee; and (e) that there
had been a violation of the vacancy clause in the policy. At
the trial of the case, the insurance company neither intro
duced evidence in support of. nor made any motions to strike
nor asked instructions based on defenses a, h, and c, named
above, and it is therefore taken for granted that these de
fenses were abandoned. The issue of ownership of the land
was submitted to the jury, and the verdict of the jury conclu
sively shows that the insurance company had notice of the
fact that Mr. Aldridge did not own the ground on which the
barn was located. Such knowledge constituted a waiver of the
provision in the policy dealing with ownership of the land.
The sole remaining defense, therefore, is the alleged violation
4  Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
of the vacancy clause of the policy, and the sole question
5" for determination on the writ of ®error is whether, as a
matter of law, the evidence showed a violation of the
vacancy clause. The evidence relating to vacancy will be dis
cussed in detail in the argument.
ASSIGNMENT OF EREOR.
The sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
entering its order of March 28,1944, setting aside the verdict
of the jury in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that, in the
opinion of the Court, the evidence, showed as a matter of law
that the harn was vacant and unoccupied, which decision was
really a belated ruling on the motions to strike, upon which
decision had been reserved.
ARGUMENT.
The petitioner contends:
First: That if the vacancy provision is applicable to this
case at all, it applies to the dwelling located on the premises
and not to the barn. If the Court concurs in this theory, there
can he no doubt of the outcome of the case because the evi
dence clearly shows that the dwelling was occupied (R.., pp.
21 and 50).
Second: Even if the vacancy provision is held to apply to
the harn, the evidence does not show, as a matter of law, that
the harn was vacant and unoccupied.
I The Vacancy Provision Does Not Apply to the Barn.
A. There Is No Binding Authority in Virginia.
6* ®No Virginia case has been found which intdrprets and
applies the vacancy clause in a fire insurance policy in a
case such as this one; that is where a harn, which is not a
structure designed for human occupancy, is insured but the
dwelling on the premises is not insured under the same policy.
The only Virginia cases found which deal with the vacancy
clause at all are the following:
Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Kinnier's Adm'x., 28
Gratt.
Watertoxvn Fire Insurance Company v. Cherry, 84 Va. 72,3
S. E. 876.
Kirk P. Aldriclge, el al., v. Piedmont Pire Ins. Co. 5
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Tilley, 88 Va. 1024,
14 8. P. SOl.
One of the points involved in Georgia Borne Insurance Com^
p■ any v. Kinnier's Adm'x,, supra, was the application of the
vacancy clause, bnt in that case the decision "was that in spite
of an undisputed vacancy, the insurance company had waived
compliance with the clause. (See 28 Gratt at pp. 106-110.)
In Watertoiun Fire Insurance Company v. Cherry, supra,
there was also an undisputed vacancy and the Court held that
the p<?licy was voided whether or not the breach of the condi
tion was wilful and substantial. In Connecticut Fire Insur
ance Company v. Tilley,.supra, separate and distinct dwell
ings were grouped under one policy, and the Court held that
the occupancy of one dwelling did not excuse the vacancy of
another dwelling.
In view of the fact that there is no binding authority con
trolling this case, it is expedient to ascertain the meaning and
•application of the vacancy clause in a fire insurance policy by
a construction of the language of the policy, by determining
the purpose for which the clause is inserted in the policy, and
by ascertaining what decisions have been reached by courts
in other jurisdictions in similar situations.
7* ®B. The Meaning of the Policy and the Purpose of the
Vacancy Clause.
The contract of insurance issued to Mr. Aldridge contains
two clauses dealing with vacancy, one clause in the pro'visions
of the policy itself and the other in the rider attached to the
policy. Lines 32, 33, .34, 56, 57 and 58 of the printed provi
sions of the policy filed as Exhibit No. 1 in this case provide
as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by agreement in -writing added
liereto this Company shall not be liable for loss or damage
occurring ® ® ® (f) while a described building, whether in
tended for occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoc
cupied beyond a period of ten days.
Certainly this provision does not apply to the barn because
it contemplates "occupancy by o-wner or tenant" and a barn
is not designed for human occupancy.
The rider attached to the policy in this case deals with the
subject of vacancy in the following language:
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Permission is hereby granted for the within described-
dwelling to become and remain vacant or unoccupied for a
period of not exceeding thirty (30) days (including the period
of ten days allowed in printed conditions of tliis policy) at
any one time. It is understood and agreed that if the vacancy
or unoccupancy exceeds thirty days at any one time, permis
sion for same must be specifically endorsed hereon, or this
entire policy shall be null and void. (Italics supplied.)
It is to be noted that the form of rider attached to the policy
contemplated insurance on the main dwelling as well as in
surance on other buildings and personal property on the prem
ises., but the particular policy issued did not insure the main
dwelhng. Had the policy included tlie main dwelling, the
barn could liave been vacant and unoccupied without creating
a forfeiture under the vacancy clause. In other words,
8* by virtue of the language ""'within described dwelling",
the vacancy clause applies to the dwelling on the prem
ises. Is this result in any way affected by the fact that the
policy actually issued did not insure the main dwelling? It
is submitted that the result is the same. The language of the
rider, "within described dwelling" is not appropriate lan-
gaiage to include a barn. Had it been the punpose of the policy
to require occupancy of the barn, that purpose could have
been readily accomplished by express language such as "with
in insured property" or ofber words of like import.
The foregoing conclusion, that the vacancy provision ap
plies to the dwelling on the premises and not to the barn,
which is not designed for human occupancy, becomes even
more obvious once it is understood why the provision is in
serted in fire insurance policies. In the absence of a vacancj'-
provision of one sort or another contained in a fire insurance
policy, there would be no prohibition whatsoever against
vacancy. However, some provision with reference to vacancy
has appeared from early times in most insurance policies and
since the trend toward the adoption of standardized policies,
vacancy provisions have become almost universal. Certainly,
it would not be said that vacancy provisions are inserted in
fire insurance policies to provide a stumbling block for the
unwary;—they are inserted in fire insurance policies for the
purpose of giving to the insurer the added protection which
naturally comes about from the presence of a human being in
or near the insured premises in order to combat possible fires.
In Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Kinnier's Adm'x.,
supra, the Court approved an instruction of the lower court
to the effect that the vacancy provision "was inserted by the
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company itself for its own protection and benefit." (28 Gratt.,
at p. 102.)
9'* "It is submitted therefore that tlie vacancy provision
of the policy applies to the dwelling on the premises and
not to the barn, which was not designed for human occupancy.
C. Decisions from Other Courts.
The foregoing conclusion, that the vacancy provision ap
plies to the dwelling house and not to the barn, arrived at on
the basis of the construction of the policy and the determina
tion of the purpose for which the provision is inserted in a
fire insurance policy, is further borne out by the decisions
of courts in other jurisdictions. Few cases have been found
in which the policy covered an outliouse not designed fox-
human habitation, but did not cover the dwelling house on the
premises, and those cases hold that the vacancy pi-ovision
applies to the dwelling house., with the exception of one case
in which the vacancy provision was held to apply to the out
house in order to prevent a forfeiture under the'policy.
In Kimball v. Monarch Insnrance Company, 70 Iowa 513,
30 N. Vr. 8G2, suit was brought on a fire in.surance policy and
the defendant appealed from a verdict for the plaintiff. The
policy was on a two story frame shingled hog house, and the
policy pi-ovidcd that if the pi-emises became vacant by the
removal of the owner or occupant, the policy should be void.
To the claim of the insurance company that the policy became
void by reason of the vacnncy of the hog house and speaking
with reference to tlie vacancy pi-ovision of the policy, the
Court said:
This condition is not against non user of the dwelling but
against vacation by removal of the owner or occupant. It
cei'tainly does not intend to bind the assured to personal oc
cupancy of the buildiuff, for it was not of a character
10* that would pei-mit it. *It surely was intended to express
nothing more than, that if the owner or occupant of the
whole pi-emises removed away, the policy should be void. It
was intended to secure the attention and watchfulness of the
owner and occupant to protect it fi-om fire. The owner of the
premises continued to reside thereon, but the hog house was
not used for some time prior to its dosti-uction.
The cases cited by counsel involve conditions against va
cancy found in policies covering dwellings and other build
ings capable of being personally occupied by the owner or
tenant (cases cited). They are therefore not in conflict with
our conclusion.
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The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has
reached a similar conclusion. In Kelly v. Utica Fire Insur
ance Company, 203 App. Div. 335, 196 N. Y. S. 795, the policy
covered barns and their contents and there was a dwelling
on the property which was not covered by the policy, which
appeared to be a New York standard policy. The Court held
that theljarns could not be considered vacant or unoccupied
so long as the house on the premises was used as a dwelling.
The Court said: "The barns which were consumed contained
stock and farm implements; and, if the dwelling house was
used as a dwelling or home, then the buildings cannot be con-
.sidered vacant or unoccupied." The head note in the un
official report on this case is as follows:
"RTiere there was a house on a fann and barns containing
stock and farm implements, under a policy covering barns and
contents, but written on policy form covering both house and
barns, providing that insurance should continue while oc
cupied as a private family residence, and that policy should
be void if a building herein described be or become vacant or
unoccupied and so remain for ten days, the buildings could
not be considered vacant or unoccupied if the house was
used as a dwelling or home.
11* *In brief, it is submitted that the law is that where a
barn is insured but the dwelling on the premises is not
insured, the vacancy provision applies to the dwelling and
not to the barn.
The only case found in which the Court held that the
vacancy provision applied to the barn and not to the dwelling
is Corlies v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company, 92 N. J. L.
108, 108A. 152. In that case there was an action on a fire
insurance policy which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff,
which was sustained on an appeal. The policy was on the
plaintiff's barn, but there was no insurance on the dwelling
on the premises. The evidence showed that the dwelling was
vacant, but that the barn was not, and the insurance company
claimed that the vacancy of the dwelling voided the policy.
The Court upheld the plaintiff's contention that the vacancy
provision applied to the barn, but on the following reason-
Courts are averse to forfeitures. They frown upon them.
A Court will seek a construction of a forfeiture clause in a
policy which will sustain it, even though a construction which
wiU defeat it is reasonably deducible from the terms or words
used to express it.
ICirk P. Aldridge, et al., v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. *9
•At any rate, this much is clear, that the condition in the
:'farm form and the one in the standard policy, relating to
forfeiture, tend to create, at least., an ambiguity, and there
fore a construction which will avoid a forfeiture will be
•adopted.
It is submitted that such an interpretation of the policy in
-this case is unwarranted if such an interpretation results in
a forfeiture, and it is respectfully submitted that the vacancy
provision in the policy in this ease should be held to apply
to the dwelling on the premises. On such an interpretation,
there -can be no doubt of the outcome of the case, 'for
12* the evidence clearly shows that the dwelling on the prop
erty was occupied.. (See particularly the testimony of
Mrs. Gibson, E., p. 50 and of Mr. Aldridge., E., p. 21.)
II The Evidence Does Not Estahlisli Vacancy.
It is only in the event that the vacancy clause is lield to ap
ply to the barn and not to the dwelling that it beconjes neces
sary to examine in any detail the evidence in the case. And in
order to put the evidence in its proper light, preliminary ref
erence should be made to the way in which the evidence should
he viewed on the motion on which the trial court based its
order of March 28, 1944, and to the fact that the burden of
proof in establishing vacancy is on the insurance company.
No particular citations are needed to the rule laid down by
the court with reference to the manner in which evidence is
to be viewed on the motion to strike or on a motion to set
aside the verdict.
With reference to the burden of proof, it is well-established
that the burden on the issue of vacan^ is on the defendant
insurance company. In 26 Corpus Juris, page 516, the rule is
thus stated:
However, under the rule now generally recognized that de
fendant, to raise an issue on a general allegation of per
formance, must particularly allege the breach relied on to
defeat a recovery, it is generally held, without regard to
whether the breach complained of is that of a condition
precedent or a promissory warranty or condition subsequent,
that defendant has the burden of proving the facts alleged
by it as constituting such a breach.
The foregoing rule was expressly recognized in Perretta v. St.
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Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 106 Misc. 91,.
13* 174 N. Y. S., 131 (afiSrmed "upon the opinion of the trial
judge in 177 N. Y. S. 923), where the Court said:
Each policy insured the building while occupied as a dwell
ing and provided that it should he void if the building, whether
intended for occupancy by owner or tenant, should be or be
come vacant or unoccupied and so remain for ten days. It
is conceded that it was vacant at the time of the fire. It is
disputed that it was for ten days before. The burden of proof
on the question was on the companies. Van Valkenburgh v..
American Popular Life Insurance Company, 70 N. Y. 605^
Mead v. America/n Fire Insurance Company, 13 App. Div. 476,.
480; 43 N. Y. S. 334.
And in Harris v. North American Insurance Company, 190
Mass. 361, 77 N. E. 493, the Court said:
The burden was on the defendant strictly to prove r.n
avoidance of its liability by showing that the acts of the plain
tiff in connection with the insured property'amounted to a
removal from the house, and produced a forfeiture.
And to the same effect, see Hoover v. Mercantile Town Mutual
Insurance Company, 93 Mo. A. Ill, 69 S. W. 42; and Walton
V. Phoenix Insurance Company, 162 Mo. A. 316, 141 S. W.
1138.
No Virginia case has been found which expressly lays down
the rule with reference to burden of proof in vacancy cases,
but the rule has been laid down iii other cases dealing with
alleged breaches of other conditions subsequent contained in
fire policies. In Morotock Insuramce Company v. Fostoria
Novelty Company, 94 Va. 361, 26 S. E. 850, the Court had
before it a case involving alleged fraudulent representations.
In discussing the burden of proof, the Court said (94 Va., at
p. 367):
As was intimated by the late Mr. Justice Paine, in May v.
Buckeye Ins. Company, 25 "Wis. 291, "it would he intolerable
to require the plaintiff, in an action "on an insurance
14* policy, in the first instance, to prove aflBrmatively the
truth of every statement usually contained in an appli
cation for insurance, of the situation and condition of the
property insured. Certainly such has not been the practice
in this State, so far as we are advised; and we do not think
the bar or courts of the State have ever supposed or under-
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stood that the law casts so heavy a burden upon the plaintiff
in such cases.
If the plaintiff be held to show affirmatively the perform
ance of conditions precedent proper, leaving it to the de
fendant to aver and prove breaches of mere warranties and
conditions subsequent, we think the ends of justice will best
be pi'omoted. Certainly the practice will be in accord with
the settled rules of pleading and evidence.
And in Aetna Insurance Company v. Asian, 123 Va. 327, 96
S. E. 772, the Court considered the question of burden of
proof with reference to the issue of increasing the hazard by
virtue of a change of occupancv, and the Court said (123 Va.,
at p. 336):
All other similar claims and arguments advanced in sup-
poi't of the motion and not hereinbefore specifically discussed
seem to be concluded by the verdict of the jury according to
2 Thompson on Trials (2d Ed.), section 1290, which reads in
part as follows: "It is a familiar rule in the law of fire in
surance that any change in the condition of the property in-
.sured, which substantially increases the risk, avoids the
policy; but whether such a change has taken place is always
a question of fact for a jury. Whether the company, in de
fending an action on a policy, relies upon the falsity of the
particular representation, or on the failure to comply with
an executory stipulation, it is upon them to prove it; and it
is a question of fact in either aspect."
Coming now to the evidence itself, we find that no defense
witness was examined by the insurance company on the sub
ject of vacancy. It is noteworthy that the defendant's
15® witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Gibson, who ®lived on the prem
ises and who wore called to testify on behalf of the in
surance company, were never even asked by the insurance
company about the use to which the barn was put (R., pp.
49-53).' Is it not logical to conclude that the questions were
not asked by the insurance company because the answers
would have been unfavorable to it! See: Croshy v. Crosby,
182 Va. 461, 29 S. E. (2nd) 241, at p. 243, and cases there
cited.
Since the defendant's witnesses were never examined on
the subject of vacancy, it necessarily follows that the trial
court's findimr. that as a matter of laAv, the evidence disclosed
a violation of the vacancv clause, must find its support in the
evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses. Of the plaintiff's wit-
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nesses, Mr. Levy R. MeGee's testimony is concerned solely
with the issue of the knowledge of the agent of the insurance
company that the harn was not on land owned by the assured
in fee simple and therefore has nothing to do with the issue
of vacancy which is now under consideration.
Lt. Aubrey L. Whitmore of the fire department was called
as a witness for the plaintiff and he testified that the harn
was burned on July 28, 1943, and that it was a complete loss.
He further testified that at the time of the fire, there was an
old tractor in the barn and also a little old lumber; and that
there was a horse nearby (E., pp. 11 and 12). The barn was
on fire when the fire department arrived on the scene, and it
would certainly be logical to conclude that the horse had
been in the barn when the fire started and bad been removed
therefrom by whoever discovered the fire. Can it be said that
on this evidence a verdict of the jury finding that the barn
was occupied would be plainly wrong?
ifi* ^Another witness for the plaintiff, Acree H. Anthony,
an employee of the fire department, corroborated the
testimony of Lt. Whitmore as to the time of the fire and the
extent of the loss.
The direct testimony of ^ Ir. Kirk P. Aldridge, like that of
Mr. McGee, is largely concerned with other issues of the case,
and the defendant's cross examination of Mr. Aldridge is not
concerned with the issue of vacancy at all. IMr. Aldridge tes
tified that at the time of the fire, his horses were not in the
barn; that they had been removed the second week in June,
when he had bad a misunderstanding with his daughter about
his remarriage, but that he still had the right to use the barn;
that he was still the sole and unconditional owner; that he did
not have actual control and possession'of the barn at the time
of the fire; that he never disposed of the barn or placed any
encumbrance on it; in short, that there had been no change
in his legal rights in the barn; and that Mrs. Gibson had a
horse in the barn (R., pp. 20 and 21). Add this testimony to
that of Lt. Whitmore that there was a tractor and some lum
ber in the barn and a horse outside at the time of the fire (R.,
pp. 11 and 12), and there is evidence from which the juiy
could find that the barn was occupied;—or more to the point,
it certainly cannot he said that the evidence establishes as a
matter of law that the barn was vacant and unoccupied.
Mr. Aldridge was not asked whether there was anything
of his in the barn at the time of the fire. He was only asked
about the removal from the hara of the personal property
which was insured under the policy. Certainly, it cannot be
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said that Mr. Aldridge should have been asked on direct ex
amination what he left in the barn and should have been
17* asked what *was in the barn at the time of the fire, he-
cause the burden of proof on the subject of vacancy is
on the insurance company.
The foregoing evidence is all of the evidence in the case
•dealing witli the physical fact of vacancy and it is submitted
that it does not show that the barn was vacant and unoccupied
as a matter of law. At the most, the only thing that can be
said of the evidence is that it does not clearly and affirma
tively cstahWsh tlial the bam was being used, but this is im
material since the burden of proof is on the insurance com
pany and it cannot complain if it had failed to prove its case
at the time it made the motions on which the order of March
28,1944, is based.
Ill Conclusion,
Your petitioner respectfully contends that the order of the
trial court is erroneous because:
1. If the vacancy provision applies to the case at all, it ap
plies to the dwelling on the promises, not to the barn, and the
evidence clearly shows that the dwelling was occupied; and
2. That even if the Court be of the opinion that the va
cancy provision applies to the barn, the burden of proof is
on the insurance company, and the evidence does not show,
as a matter of law, that the bam was vacant and unoccupied.
PRAYER.
.  In the premises, therefore, your petitioner prays that a
writ of error and supersedeas may be awarded him to
18* the said order; that the same ®may be caused to come
before this Court; that the errors therein assigned may
be reviewed; and that the said order be reversed and the ver
dict of the jury be reinstated and final judgment be granted
your petitioner.
Your petitioner adopts this petition as his opening brief
and your petitioner certifies that a copy of this petition was
delivered to Alexander H. Sands, Esq., Counsel for the Pied
mont Fire Insurance Company in the trial court, on the 9th
day of June, 1944. This petition is to be filed in the oflSee of
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals at Richmond.
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Counsel for the petitioner desires to state orally the rea
sons for reviewing the order complained of.
Respectfully submitted,
TTTRK P. ALDRtDGE AND IQRK P. ALDRIDGE





I, Philip Freeman, an attorney at law, of Petersburg, Vir
ginia, duly qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of Ap
peals of Virginia, hereby certify that, in my opinion, the or
der complained of in the foregoing petition ought to he re
viewed.
PHILIP FREEMAN.
Received June 9, 1944.
M. B. WATTS, Clerk.
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RECORD
VIRGINIA:
In the Circuit Court for the County of Prince George,
Before Hon. J. J. Temple, Judge, and a Jury, March 2,1944.
Kirk P. Aldridge, and Kirk P. Aldridge, trading as Aldridge
Riding Stables,
■V.
Piedmont Fire Insurance Company.
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Appearances: Frederick H. Cole, Attorney for the plain
tiff;
Alexander H. Sands, Attorney for the defendant.
(Witnesses called, sworn, and excluded.)
page 2 \ NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT.
Virginia:
In the Circuit Court in the County of Prince George.
Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge, trading as Aldridge
Riding Stables,
Piedmont Fire Insurance Company.
To the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company:
You are hereby notified that on the 30th day of December.
1943, between the hours of 10:00 A. M. and 4 :*00 P. M., or as
soon tliereafter as it ma'- be heard, the undersigned will move
the Circuit Court of Prince George County^ Virginia, at the
Court House thereof, for a judgment against you for the
sum of one thousand dollars, with interest thereon from the
21st day of July, 1943, until paid, together with the costs in
cident to this proceeding, all of wliich is justly due and owing
from you to the undersigned under and by virtue of a cer
tain contract of assurance in writing made by you on the
23rd day of September, 1942, through L. W. T. Bulifant, your
accredited agent \yith power to select risks and issue policies
on property within the territorial limits of Prince George
County, Virginia, said agent having his office in the
page 3 \ City of Petersburg, Virginia, which contract is your
policy No. 1057 and was issued to the undersigned
as "Aldridge Riding Stables (IHrk P. Aldridge)", by which
said contract you agreed, promised, and undertook to insure
the undersigned, in consideration of thirty-three dollars and
twenty cents paid, against loss and damage by fire to an
amount not exceeding three thousand dollars, that is to say,
one thousand dollars on my barn, one thousand dollars on niv
horses, and one thousand dollars on my riding equipment,
as set out and described in the said policy, all of which prop
erty was at the time of the issuance of the contract of assur
ance located in Prince George County, Virginia, for the term
of one year from the 23rd day of September, 1942, at noon.
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to the 23rd day of September, 1943, at noon, the said assur
ance being to the extent of the actual cash value of the prop
erty at the time of loss, not exceeding the principal amount of
the policy, distributed as aforesaid, and to he paid by you
within sixty days after due notice and proof of loss.
And the said plaintiff says that before and at the time of
making the said policy of assurance as aforesaid and at all
times up to and including the time of the loss and damage
hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff was and is interested in
the said objects of insurance mentioned above to a
page 4 [ large amount, to-wit, the sum of three thousand dol
lars, and that between the 20th day of July, 1943,
at noon, and the 21st day of July, 1943, at noon, to-wit, at or
about three o'clock A. M. on the 21st day of July, 1943, the
said barn was burned, consumed, and desti'oyed by fire and
direct loss and damage thereby occasioned to the plaintiff to
the extent of one thousand dollars in such manner and un
der such circumstances as to come within the terms of the
said policy and render liable and obligate you to insure the
said plaintiff against loss and damage by fire to the amount
of one thousand dollars, that due notice and proof of loss were
afterward made by the plaintiff to the defendant in con
formity with the terms of the said policy and on a foi*m pro
vided by the defendant.
And the plaintiff further says that ho has performed, ful
filled, observed, and complied with each and all of the effec
tive conditions, provisions, stipulations, and warranties of
the said policy on his part and behalf to be performed, ful
filled, observed, and complied with, and has violated none of
its effective prohibitions, according to the true effect, intent,
and meaning of the said policy.
And the plaintiff further says that he has requested you to
appoint an appraiser to appraise the said loss, as provided for
in the said policy, but that you have flatly refused to make
such appointment.
Notwithstanding the foregoing and although
page 5 }■ sixty days has elapsed since due notice and proof
of loss of said direct loss and damage by fire was
provided the defendant as aforesaid, you have not made good
to the undersigned the said loss and damage to the extent
of one thousand dollars, or any part thereof, but the same
and every part thereof are wholly unpaid and unsatisfied to
the undersigned, contrary to the form and effect of the said
policy, and although requested, you have wholly neglected,
failed, and refused, and still neglect, fail, and refuse to keep
and perform your said agreement and contract.
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Wherefore, judgment against you for the sum of one thou-
:sand dollps, with interest thei-eon from the 21st day of July,
1943, until paid, together with the costs incident to this pro-
•ceeding, will be asked at the hands of the honorable court at
the time and place hereinbefore set out
Given under my hand this 30th day of November, 1943.
Eespectfully,
KIRK P. ALDRIDGE AND KIRK P. ALDRIDGE,
TRADING AS ALDRIDGE RIDING STABLES,
By counsel
<Sgd) FREDERICK H. COLE, p. q.
Filed Dec. 4th, 1943,
GEORGE R. WALTERS, Clerk,
page 6 } RETURN;
Executed in the City of Richmond, Virginia, December 3,
1943, by delivering in duplicate (with a fee of $2.50) a copy
of within notice of motion to Mr. R. E. Wilkins, the Secretary
•of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the person in charge
of said office, and as such the statutory agent for Piedmont
Fire Insurance Company.
J. HERBERT MERCER,
Sheriff of the City of Richmond,
Virginia,
by S. J. WINGFIELD,
Deputy Sheriff.
Sheriff's fee 50 cts. paid.
And on another day, to-wit, December 29,1943, the defend
ant, by its attorney, filed its grounds of defense, as follows:
Yirginia:
In the Circuit Court in the County of Prince George.
Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge trading as Aldridge
Riding Stables,
V.
Piedmont Fire Insurance Company.
fg Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE.
This defendant, by its attorney, comes and says tliat the?
plaintiff should not have and maintain this motion for judg
ment against this defendant for the following reasons; and
this defendant files this, its grounds of defense, to said mo
tion for judgment:
page 7 ]- (1) That the entire insurance policy, on which.
this motion for judgment is based, is void and can
not he enforced for the following reasons:
(a) Because the insured concealed and misrepresented ma
terial facts and circumstances concerning the subject of said
insurance.
(b) Because the interest of the insured in sundry items of
property insured was other then unconditional and sole own
ership.
(c) Because the insured had no insurable interest in the
building upon which he sought and obtained the policy of in
surance here sued upon.
(d) Because the subject of this insurance is a building-
whieh was on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple.
(e) Because the insured, contrary to the provisions of said
policy, made false and misleading statements in the proof of
loss furnished the defendant as to the title, interest and own
ership of the property insured.
(f) Because of change in interest, title and possession of
the subject of insurance.
(g) Because the building insured at the time of the fire
was and had been vacant and/or unoccupied beyond the pe
riod of time permitted under the teims and conditions of said
policy, of which the company had no notice.
Wherefore, and by reason of the violations and
page 8 }• breaches of the provisions, covenants and war
ranties aforesaid, as well as others, of the policy
sued upon on the part of the plaintiff the said policy became
and was and is void and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
thereon.
PIEDMONT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
by counsel.
(sgd) ALEXANDER H. SANDS, p. d.
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And on another day, to-wit, January 18, 1944, the plaintiif,
by his attorney, moved the Court as follows:
This day came the plaintiff, by his attorney, and moved the
Court that the defendant be required to file an amended
grounds of defense on or before February 21,1944.
And this case is set for trial on the 2nd day of March, 1944.
And on another day, to-wit, February 21, 1944, the defend
ant, by its attorney, filed its amended grounds of defense as
follows:
Virginia:
In the Circuit Court in the County of Prince George.
Kirk P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge trading as Aldridge
Eiding Stables,
V.
Piedmont Fire Insurance Company.
AMENDED GROUNDS OF DEFENSE.
The defendant, in compliance with order entered
page 9 y on the motion of the plaintiff that it file an amended
grounds of defense in which the facts upon which
the defendant bases its defense shall be stated, files this
amendment to the grounds of defense heretofore filed assert
ing that the facts relied upon as the basis of paragraphs (a)
and (e) in such grounds of defense ai-e that the plaintiff when
procuring said insurance from the defendant concealed
and/or misrepresented these material facts (1) that the in
terest of the insured as to the property mentioned in para
graph (b) of the grounds of defense was not sole and uncon
ditional; (2) that the plaintiff concealed from the insurer the
fact that the building upon which the insurance was sought
was not situated on ground owned by the insured in fee
simple, and that such concealment of such material facts as
related was also made in the proof of loss furnished by the
plaintiff to the defendant, and that by reason thereof the
statements so contained in such proof of loss were false and
misleading.
And defendant avers that by reason of the premises the
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Auhrey L. Whiimore.
policy was rendered void and unenforcible, and the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover in this suit.
PIEDMONT FIRE iNSURANCE COMPANY,
hy counsel.
(sgd) ALEXANDER H. SANDS, p. d.
page 10 And on another day, to-wit, March 2, 1944, the
case came on for tx'ial:
This day came the parties, hy their attorneys, and the de
fendant pleaded the general issue. Whereupon came a jury,
to-wit, Willie E. Tomko, E. C. White, J. P. Hall, Frank J.
Soueek, Alfi'ed Sipos, T. A. Davis, and C. E. Dise, who, be
ing selected and empaneled according to law, were sworn the
truth to speak upon the issue joined.
Stenographic report of testimony and other incidents of the
trial.
On motion of the plaintiff, hy counsel, the witnesses in the
case were excluded from the courtroom.
STIPULATION: It is stipulated hy and between the par
ties, by counsel, that the fire took place on July 28, 1943,
rather than on July 21, 1943, as alleged in the notice of mo
tion.
page 11 \ LT. AUBREY L. WHITMORE,
sworn for the plaintiff;
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Lieutenant, mil you please state your name and age?
Answer: Auhrey L. Whitmore; 37 years old.
Q. Where are you employed?
A. The Petersburg Fire Department. I am a Lieutenant
in the Department.
Q. Were you called, as an employee of the Fire Department,
to fight a fire at the Aldridge Riding Stahles last year?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you recall the day and the time?
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Aubrey L. Whitmore.
A. Yes, sir, it was July 28, 1943, in the morning, at 3:30
A. M.
Q. What was on fii-e?
A. The stable and shed, all combined, and a barn I imagine.
It was a long building, all together.
Q. It was one big building that was burned?
A. Yes., sir.
Q. Was it a complete loss?
A. Yes., sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not there was anything in the
barn at the time of the fire?
A. No, sir, I did not observe anything in the barn other
than an old tractor at the lower end, under the shed, and a
little old lumber, that might have been scrap lumber put un
der there out of the weather. Other than that, I
page 12 }■ did not observe anything else.





Q. In reference to the location of the tractor, was that in
the barn or in the shed?
A. It was in the shed.
Q. That was not destroyed, was it?
A. Yes, sir, the shed and barn was destroyed, all except
the lower end of the shed, just one side of it.
Q. The long, big building, was totally destroyed?
A. Yes., sir.
Q. And you did not observe anything in there at all?
A. No, sir, I did not. It was entirely destroyed.
By the Court:
Q. Lieutenant, where was that building located?
A. On the Hopewell Road at Stop 8, in Prince George
County, Virginia.
Witness stood aside.
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Acree H. Anthony, Jr. Kirk P. Aldridge.
page 13 \ AGREE H. ANTHONY, JR.,
sworn for the plaintiff:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Will you please state your name and age ?
Answer: Acree H. Anthony; 33 years old.
Q. VHiere are you employed?
A. Petersburg Fire Department, Halifax Street Station.
Q. Did you go to the Aldridge Riding Stables; at the time
the stables were burned?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know when that was?
A. It was on the morning of July 28, 1943, at 3:30 o'clock.
Q. WTiat hurned at that time?
A. He had a long frame stable there, and a barn.
Q. It was all one building?
A. Yes, sir.




page-14 \ KIRK P. ALDRIDGE,
sworn on his own behalf:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Will you please state your name and age?
Answer: Kirk P. Aldridge; 46 years of age.
Q. Mr. Aldridge, were you the proprietor and operator of
the Riding stables known as the Aldridge Riding Stables?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was this stable located in Prince George County?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the plaintiff in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you the sole holder of the fire insurance policy about
which this suit is brought?
A. Yes, sir.
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Kirh P. Aldridge.
Q. Have you paid the premium on the policy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From whom did you purchase this policy?
A. Mr. L. W. T. Bulifant.
Q. Was Mr. Bulifant the agent for the Piedmont Fire In
surance Company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So far as you know, did Mr. Bulifant have the power to
select risks, and to issue policies?
Mr. Sands: That is conceded. It is conceded that he was
the agent for the Piedmont Fii*e Insurance Company.
Mr. Cole: With the power to select risks and
page 15 issue policies for the Piedmont Fire Insurance
Company?
Mr. Sands: Yes, sir, such as this policy.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mr. Aldridge, did you act in good faith in the purchase
of this policy?
Mr. Sands: I object to the form of the question, if your
Honor please. It is leading.
The Court: Be-frame the question.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mr. Aldridge, in purchasing this policy, did you think
at the time that you had been completely frank with the insur
ance company?
Mr. Sands: I submit that that question is impi-oper. It is
a question as to Avhat he did.
The Court: I think he should state the circumstances un
der which he secured the policy, and what statement, if any,
he made.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mr. Aldridge, prior to the time that you bought this
policy, did you have any discussion with Mr. Bulifant, the
agent, about it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did that conversation take place?
A. It was on a Sunday in September, 1942.
Q. Do you know the exact date ?
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Kirl P. Aldridge.
page 16 }• A. It was the 13th.
Q. "Where did this conversation take place?
A. In Mr. McGee's office, at the Hill Top Cab Company's
place of business.
Q. "Was any other person present at the time of this con
versation?
A. Yes, sir, Mr. McGee.
Q. What is Mr. McGee's full name?
A. Levy R. McGee.
Q. What was that conversation?
A. Mr. Bulifant asked me about insurance on tbe new barn
I was building on the Hopewell Road; and I told him I was
not the owner of the land; that I was building the barn on my
daughter's property; and he said that he did not think it
would make any difference; that I could have it insured. .
Q. Did you tell Mr. Bulifant—
Mr. Sands: I object.
Mr. Cole: I am simply trying to re-emphasize the state
ment that he has made.
Mr. Sands: I submit that that is one reason why it cannot
be done.
The Court: You can ask him what he said to Mr. Bulifant.
By the Court:
Q. What did you say to Mr. Bulifant?
A. I asked him could I insure the barn I was building on the
Hopewell Roadj that it was my daughter's land,
page 17 and that I had given that land to my daughter; and
he said he thought I could. And he took out the
insurance, and I got the policy.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Did he tell you that the insurance could be issued under
those circumstances?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you authorize Mr. Bulifant to go ahead and write
the policy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said something about not owning the land. Did you
purchase the land?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much did you pay for it?
A. $3,500.00.
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Kirli P. Aldridge.
<Q. Did j-nu pay cash?
A. Yes, sir. •
Q. Do you remember when yon purchased it?
X Yes, sir, it was in July, 1942.
Q. From whom did you purchase it?
A. From Mi*s. Holloway, of Richmond, Virginia.
Q. In whose name was the deed taken?
A. In the name of Mrs. Louise Dunford Gibson.
Q. What were your intentions when you pni'chased this
property ?
Mr. Sands: I object. I submit that his intentions would
not be evidence,
page 18 The Court: What is the relevancy of it?
Mr. Cole: I just want to show that it was a gift
to his daughter. Mr. Sands so stated in his opening state
ment.
Mr. Sands: Yes, but not the purpose.
By the Court:
Q. Did you say why it was?
A. I gave it to her as a home, so that I could go there;
and it was not to be sold as long as I was living. That was
not in writing, but that is what I told her.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Was the bam on the property at the time you purchased
the land?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you build the bam?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was the owner of the bam?
A. I was.
Q. Who was entitled to use the bam?
A. I was.
Q. What was the barn used for?
A. Riding stables.
Q. Was the riding stable operated for profit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was the sole and unconditional owner of the bam?
A. I was.
Q. Was that true up to the time of the fire?
page 19 } A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did a fire bum the bam?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. And that is the same barn that was insured under this;
policy? . _
A. Yes,, sir.
Q. "When did you first know about the fire?
A. I was asleep at the time,, between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock
in the morning, and my daughter called Mrs. Stevens over
the telephone, and they got me out of bed and told me the barn,
was on fire-
Q. "Where were you at that time?
A. I was at home asleep.
Q. "When was this barn built?
A. In August, 1942,
Q. Approximately how much did it cost?
A. It cost $1,200,00.
Q. How much was the bam worth at the time of the fire?
A. About $1,200.00,
Q. How much would it have cost to replace the. barn after
the fire?
A. The same amount.
Q. "Was it a complete loss?
A. Yes, sir.
Q, Had you ever feared that the barn might bum?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What caused you to fear tliat?
page 20 \ A. The Norfolk & Western Railroad tracks were
within 150 feet of the barn.
Q. Had you done anything to protect your property against
fire?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What had you done?
A. I had doors cut in each stall to get the horses out,
Q. At the time of the fire were any of your horses in the
bam?
A. No, sir.
Q. When had you removed the horses?
A. The second week in June.
Q. Of what year ?
A. In 1943.
Q. "Why had you removed your horses from the barn?
A. Because my daughter and I had had a little misunder
standing.
Q. "V^at was that misunderstanding?
A. She objected to my re-marrying.
Q. And at that time you removed your horses from the
bam?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you still have the right to use the bam as you saw
fit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you still the sole and unconditional owner of the
barn?
A. Yes, sir.
page 21 Q. Has the insurance company paid you for the
loss ? '
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you notify them of the loss ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you filed a proof of loss ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have actual control and possession of the barn
at the time of the fire?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever sell the barn?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever give it away?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you place any encumbrances on it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Had there been any change in your rights in the barn?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you left the barn, did your daughter, Mrs. Gibson,
have anything in the barn?
A. I understand they had a horse out there in the barn.
Q. Did you have any other insurance on the barn?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did your daughter live in the house on tliis property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How close was tlie house to the barn?
A. I reckon about 200 feet, or something like that.
Q. Has the insurance company ever returned the
page 22 premium on your policy?
A. No, sir.
Q. During the time that your riding stable was operated,
was it operated at a profit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you own any property in Petersburg, Virginia?
A. I own a couple of homes in East Petersburg.
Q. You own two houses in East Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any deeds of trust on them ?
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A. There is a deed of trust on one of them.
Q. Do you own an automobile?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cole: May it please the Court, we desire to file in
evidence now the insurance policy. No. 1057, of the Piedmont
Fire Insurance Company, dated September 23, 1942, issued
by the agent of the company, Mr. L. W. T. Bulifant.
Insurance policy referred to marked Exhibit No. 1, accord
ingly filed, hereto attached, and is as follows:
page 23 [ CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Sands:
"Q. Mr. Aldridge, referring to your testimony in respect to
the conversation that took place between you and Mr. Buli
fant when this insurance was placed, you say it took place
where?
A. In the Hill Top Cab Company's office.
Q. Wliere is that located? ''
A. In the Terminal Building, Sycamore Street, Petersburg,
Virginia, upstairs, on the second floor.
Q. Have you an office there? .
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the same building?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which floor is your office on?
A. The same floor.
Q. The same room?
A. No, sir, across the hall.
Q. And you say that took place on a Sunday?
A. Yes, sir.
Q, And your recollection is that it was the 13th of Sep
tember, and there was present in there when that conversa
tion took place who?
A. Myself, Mr. Levy McGee, and Mr. Bulifant.
Q. Just the three of you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that the first time that you had dis-
page 24 }■ cussed with Mr. Bulifant the subject of insuring
that barn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You had not asked him for any insurance before?
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A. No, sir,
Q. Had he ever asked yon as to whether or not he conld
obtain insurance on that dwelling on this place, as well as on
the barn?
A. He asked me about that, and I told him the place was
not mine—the dwelling house; that I put the barn up there;
that the land did not belong to me, but the barn did.
Q. When did that conversation take place!
A. That same day. He wanted to insure them both. And
he know the land did not belong to me.
Q. How did he know that?
A. Because I told him.
_Q. Did you tell him that your daughter had promised to
give you a home there as long as you lived ?
A. Yes, sir, I told him that I was supposed to have a home
there, hut that it was not in wi-iting, and that I did not own
the place,
Q. You told him that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was the first time that you discussed insur
ance with him. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir. I discussed it with him on that Sunday. I
discussed with him the matter of insuring the bam on that
Sunday.
page 25 \ Q. And what was the time about the house?
A. The same time.
Q. And that was Sunday, the 13th.of September?
A. Yes, sir,
Q. And you told him that you would let him insure the
barn, but not the house?
A. I told him the home did not belong to me; that that was
on my daughter's property, but that I was the owner of that
barn.
Q. And that you did not have control of the house and conld
not give him that insurance?
A. I told him I did not own the house; that Mr. Gibson
would insure that himself. I just gave him the insurance on
the barn.
Q. And you told him that that land did not belong to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that is the only time you ever discussed that sub
ject with him at all? Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he said that he thought that would be all right;
that he coul(^insure it in that way?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he tell you that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was in the presence of Mr. McGee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that Mr. McGee has had some
page 26 ^  trouble with Mr. Bulifant?
A. I do not know about that
Q. Has he brought a suit against Mr. Bulifant?
A. I do not know about that.
Q. You do not know whether Mr. Cole represents him?
Mr. Cole: I object to that. It has nothing to do with tbis
case.
Mr. Sands: I just want to find out the relationship be
tween Mr. McGee and Mr. Aldridge.
The Court: But you ai'e asking him about the relationship
between Mr. McGee and Mr. Bulifant now.
Mr. Sands: All right.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Now, then, when the policy was delivered, where was it
delivered to you?
A. At my ofiSce.
Q. By whom?
A. Mr. Bulifant brought it in there.
Q. On the date which the policy shows?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you paid him the premium?
A. Yes, sir, I paid it later.
Q. Now, at that time you applied for $3,000.00 of insur
ance? Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did you conduct that business?
A. I do not know exactly. For ^  right good while.
Q. Did you keep that business going until the
page 27 latter part of May, 1943?
A. Yes, sir, I kept it up until June.
Q. And where did you take those horses ?
A. To East Petersburg, and sold them to Mr. Olsen.
Q. How manj'^ horses did you take away?
A. Eight horses.
Q. How many did you sell Olsen ?
A. Three.
Q. What for? o
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A. $100.00 or $200.00. I do not know the prices. He gave
me a note.
Q. What did you do with the note ?
A. He paid the money to me.
Q. How much was the note for?
A. I think it was $190.00 for tlie three horses.
Q. What did he pay vou for tliat note?
A. He paid me the full amount.
Q. He paid you the full amount?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you attempt to sell that note to Mr. Bulifant?
A. I asked him something ahout it.
Q. Did you give Mr. Bulifant a price on that note,—what
you would sell it to him for?
A. I do not remember now.
Mr. Cole: If your Honor please, I object to this line of
questioning. I do not see that it has anything to
page 28 }■ do with this case. Mr. Sands is trying to becloud
the issue.
The Court: I do not see the relevancy of the testimony.
Mr. Sands: It leads up. I understood Mr. Cole,- in his
opening statement, to say that the reason for the breach be
tween this witness and his daughter and the reason why he
moved his stock from there, was due to the fact that he'had
had a fuss with his daughter, and, therefore, he moved every
thing away from there, and that it was because of an argii-
nient as to whether or not he should re-marry. And I think
it is important if I can show to the contrary—that that had
nothing to do with it.
The Court: This e.xamination has nothing to do with the
relationship between tliis witness and his daughter. And
whether he discounted the note or offered to discount the note
has nothing, to do with the issue in this case.
Mr. Sands: It is why he vacated the property. He says
he had an argument with his daughter about his re-marriage.
T am attempting to show an entirely different reason. It is
to show the good faith of his statement. I am prepared to
.show that the reason he got rid of those horses was that ho
lost money, and was selling notes at a discount,
page 29 [ The Court: I think that is rather far afield.
And I think that should not he in the presence of
the juiy.
Mr. Sands: If your Honor desires it, the jurv may be ex
cluded.
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The Court: I will exclude this line of testimony at this
time.
Mr. Sands: I note an exception to your Honor's ruling.
The Court: The jury will disregard the testimony as to
the sale of horses, the amount the witness got for them, and
the attempted sale of notes at a discount—that is, at this
time.
Later, if a reason for it is shown, it may be taken up in the
absence of the jury.
I understand you note an exception.
Mr. Sands: Yes, sir, I do.
Witness: I would like to answer the question about the
notes.
Mr. Cole: You cannot do that right now, Mr. Aldridge.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Mr. Aldridge, I hand you this paper and ask you
whether or not it is a sworn statement—a proof of loss—
signed "Aldridge Riding Stables, Kirk P. Aldridge," and ask
you if that is your signature to that paper!
page 30 }■ A. (Examining) That is right.
Q. That is your signature?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, when you filed that, did you make any statement on
that paper as to—
Mr. Cole: If your Honor please, I object to the question.
If Mr. Sands has something particular in mind about the
proof of loss, it should be pointed out to the witness.
The Court: Yes, the written statement speaks for itself.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Did you make any statement in furnishing that proof of
loss, except the language found on it?
A. No, sir, I did not make any other statement.
Q. You made no,other statement to Mr. Bulifant, or to any
agent of the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company, as to the
loss except what is found in this statement? Is that correct?
A. I notified him of the loss by letter.
Q. But outside of that you made no other statement?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, in respect to the statement as to the ownership
of that land being in your daughter's name, did you ever
have anv other conversation with Mr. Bulifant about that.
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<6X00131 that which took place on that Sunday in September
which you mentioned ?
page 311 A. No., sir.
Q- That is the only conversation you had with
Mr. Bulifant about it?
A. I had that conversation; and he said to go ahead and
have the bam insured.
Q. And that conversation, on Sunday, September 13th, was
the only time you discussed the ownership of the land?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that is the only time ?
A. Yes, sir, but I had several more conversations with him.
Q. But that is the only time you mentioned the ownership
of the property?
A. Yes, sir,
Q. What was he doing there on that Sunday?
A. He was in the office of Mr. McGee. I think they were
partners in the Hill Top Cab business.
Q. And you went across the hall, in his office?
A. I was in his office at that time?
Q. And you are positive that that is the only discussion of
any character that you ever had with him concerning the
ownership of the property?
The Court: He has stated that.
Mr. Sands: I offer that proof of loss as an exhibit.
Proof of loss referred to accordingly filed, marked Exhibit
No. 2, hereto attached, and is as follows:
page 32 By the Court:
Q. When did you say you took the riding equip
ment and horses away from there?
A. The second week in June, 1943.
Witness stood aside.
page 33 }■ LEVY R. McGEE,
sworn for the plaintiff;
DIRECT EXAmNATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Will you please state your name and age?
Answer: Levy R. McGee; 40 years old.
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Q. What is your occupation?
A. I own some cabs in Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. What is the name of your cab company?
A. The Hill Top Cab Company. .
Q. WTiere do you have your office?
A. In the Terminal Building, at the corner of Wythe and
Sycamore Streets. We were in there, but we are across from
there now, on the other corner, by that service station tliere.
Q. In September of 1942, where was your office?
A. In the Terminal Building.
Q. Do you know Mr. D. W. T. Bulifant?
A.. Ygs sir*
Q. Do you know Mr. Kirk P. Aldridge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you ever present when Mr. Bulifant and Mr.
Aldridge had a conversation with reference to the insurance:
of a bam located on the Hopewell Road?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did that conversation take place?
A. In Our office, of the cab company.
Q. What was the conversation ?
page 34 [ A. We were in there on a Sunday morning, Mr.
Bulifant and myself, and Mr, Aldridge came in and
they got to talking, and Mr. Bulifant is an insurance agent,
and he asked Mr. Aldridge about insurance on his new barn—
that he had just built—and Mr. Aldridge asked him could he
insure if. He said that the place the barn was on he had
given to his daughter, and that it was deeded to her; and Mr.
Bulifant told him that that did not make any difference as
long as he was building the barn himself and the barn be
longed to him.
Q. Do you recall whether or not there was any conversa
tion at that time with reference to any insurance on the
house ?
A. No, sir. But he did tell Mr. Aldridge, "You have given
me your other insurance. You ought to give me that too."
I do not know whether it was on the house or on his other
equipment. He had horses, etc., in the same building.
Q. Did Mr. Bulifant tell Mr. Aldridge that the insurance—
Mr. Sands: If your Honor please, I submit that Mr. Cole
should not ask leading questions.
The Court: You may ask what he did and what he said.
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By Mr. Cole:
Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Bulifant tell Mr. Aldridge
about the insurance?
A. Well, he just asked him about taking it out; and he said,
"You have some insurance with me, and you ought to take
that out with me too;" and Mr. Aldridge said he
page 35 did not know whether he could or not; that he had
given the place to his daughter and it was deeded
to her—^whether he could insure the barn on her place; and
!Mr. Bulifant told him, as long as the barn belonged to him
and he had built it, he could insure it on anybody's place.
CROSS EXAillXATION.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Now, you say you and Mr. Bulifant were there., and Mr.
Aldridge came in there ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was Sunday, the 13th of September, 1942 ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long had Mr. Bulifant been in there at that time?
A. I sruess a half hour or more.
Q. What was his business with you?
A. Well, at the time we were partners in the cab business.
Q. And he was there for that purpose?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Attending to his cab business with you ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you still in the cab business?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you still in the cab business with him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you had litigation with Mr. Bulifant about the cab
business ?
Mr. Cole: If your Honor please, may I suggest
page 36 } that the jury be excused for the moment, so that
we may go into the question of the relevancy of
that.
The Court: I think it would be better for us to go into
the other room.
(Whereupon the Court and the attorneys retired to the
Judge's Room, adjoining the Courtroom, and the following
occurred out of the hearing of the jury):
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Mr. Cole: It is apparent that the purpose of this question
is to attack the credibility of Mr. McGee's testimony. And
the plaintiff takes the position that such attack cannot be
made until Mr. Bulifant has been put on the witness stand
and examined, and then only if Mr. Bulifant and Mr. McGee
are in conflict as to the conversation.
Mr. Sands: If the Court please, it is not the primary pur
pose at this time to attack, but the question I submit is rele
vant because it will show tlie interest or bias that the witness
has in being favorable to one or unfavorable to another party
concerned in this litigation; and, therefore, the evidence
would seem to be relevant and proper for this purpose.
The Court; The motion to exclude the testimony is over
ruled; to which counsel for the plaintiff excepts?
page 37 }■ Mr. Cole: Yes, sir.
{Whereupon, the Court and the attorneys returned to the
courtroom, and the case proceeded).
A. Well, he sold his part of the business out to another
party.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Is that your answer to the question!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I say, have you had any litigation with him concerning
the business?
A. Yes, sir, in straightening up on it. We have not ex
actly straightened up on it.
Q. Why didn't you answer to that effect just now? You
did have litigation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you"bring a suit against him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Has that suit been decided?
A. Ho, sir, not yet.
Q. What did you charge in that suit against him?
A. Well, the books do not total correctly.
Q. And you are bringing a suit against him for that!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Has he brought a countersuit against you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Has there been an accounting?
page 38 }■ A. Yes, sir, I think so.
Q. And has that case been decided?
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A. No, sir,
Q. When did that litigation start?
A. I could not tell you exactly the date now.
Q. Within the last twelve months?
A. Yes, sir, it was witliin the last six months,
Q. Some time tliis year?
A. No, sir, it was last year; 1943,
Q. And that suit is still pending?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long were you in business with !Mr, Bulifant?
A. From April, 1942, until July 15th, of 1943,
Q. And he was down there that Sunday morning to talk
with you about that business in which you were both inter-
•ested?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that is the only conversation that occurred in your
presence conceniing tliis case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And according to your recollection, there was no men
tion of the other house there, except that jMr. Bulifant asked
him to let him insure his new barn?
A. Yes, sir, Mr. Bulifant said, "I have your other insur
ance, how about insuring that new barn you have?"
Q. And what did Mr. Aldridge say?
A. Mr. Aldridge told him that if it was all right he would
take the policy with him.
page 39 }■ Q. If he would do it, he would take the policy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. AVas there anything said about the amount?
A. No, sir, Mr. Bulifant told him he would get the policy
for him, but did not mention the amount right then,
Q. What was the policy for?
A. It was for the barn.
Q. Just for the barn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Anything else?
A. I think he said he had some horses, and riding equip
ment. He said for his barn and the equipment in it.
Q. Did he say anything about the amount of it?
A. No, sir. •
Q. Nothing about how much on the horses,, or how much on
the bam at all?
A. No, sir, not at that time.
Q. And that is all you know about it?
A. Yes, sir.
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Witness stood aside.
Mr. Cole: That is the plaintiff.'^s ease.
Mr, Sands: If your Honor please, may I make a motion?"
The Court: Do you think the jury should be excluded? Is
it a motion to strike?
Mr. Sands: Yes, sir, at this time,
page 40 ^ The Court: Do you want to he heard on that?
Mr. Sands: I think so.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, retire.
(Jury retired.)
Mr. Sands: If your Honor please, this motion to strike
generally is made at this time, and it is directed to a com
plete defense interposed by the defendant to the plaintiff's
case, arising on the subject of the violation of the vacancy
clause of the insurance policy, to which I immediately call
your attention.
If it not directed to other aspects, but I submit that, if
the testimony is, as I recall it and the policy is as I recollect
it, this would not be a motion which the Court would want
to postpone until the conclusion of the case, because, under
the decisions that I have, this would he the exception.
The Court: What are the provisions of the policy with
reference to the vacancy clause ?
Mr. Sands: There are two references in the policy on that
subject:
(Referring to policy) The provision here, beginning with
line 32 of this standard policy, reads:
"Unless otherwise provided by agreement in writing added
thereto this company shall not be liable for loss or damage
occurring.''
And then I skip dow to line 56:
page 41 ) "While a described building, whether intended
for occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or
unoccupied«heyond a period of ten days."
Now, there has been put into the provisions of the policy.
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on the Virginia rider., which is attached to this policy, on
farm property, this provision:
"Vacancy permit: Permission is hereby granted for the
within described dwelling to become and remain vacant or
unoccupied for a period of not exceeding thirty days (includ
ing the period of ten days allowed in printed conditions of
this policy) at any one time. It is understood and agreed
that if the vacancy or unoccupancy exceeds thirty days at
any one time, permission for same must be specifically en
dorsed hereon, or this entire policy shall be null and void."
Tlie policy is in evidence.
The Court: Is there any rider attached permitting va
cancy?
Mr. Sands: No, sir.
The Court: And tliere is no testimony that such request
for a vacancy permit was made?
Mr. Sands: That is right.
The Court: I overrule the motion to strike at this time;
and, if necessary to do so, I will later consider that point of
law as to whether or not that is an absolute defense.
Mr. Sands: I note an exception.
'  (Jury recalled.)
page 42 [ TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENDANT.
L. W. T. BULIFANT,
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. VTaat is your name?
Answer: L. W, T. Bulifant.
Q. VHiere do you live?
A. 414 Lafayette Avenue, Colonial Heights, Chesterfield
County, Virginia.
Q. And where is your place of business?
A. .38 Franklin Street, Petersburg,'Virginia.
Q. You are an agent, are you not, of the defendant in this
case, the Piedmont Fire Insurance Company?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Do you recall placing this insurance, Policy No. 1057,
which has been introduced in evidence, from September 23,
1942, to September 23, 1943., $3,000.00, for the Aldridge Rid
ing Stables ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The premium, the whole thing, was $33.20? Is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the policy describes three items of $1,000.00 each:
$1,000.00 on frame building with approved roof. That is
known as the barn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was for his horses and all?
page 43 }■ A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then there is $1,000.00 on horses, in case
of loss no one animal to be valued at more than $200.00 per
head? Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then $1,000.00 on harness, saddles., and other riding
or driving equipment?
A. That is right.
Q. Will you please tell the jury, when you placed that policy,
whether any statement was made to you, and the conversa
tion had when the policy was placed, and all of the circum
stances about it ?
A. When I first talked with Mr. Aldridge about the insur
ance, there was reference to liability insurance in the riding of
the horses.
Q. The danger incident to the riding of the horses ?
A. Yes, sir. And I got in touch with my company and asked
them if they could handle that insurance; and they said they
could not.
Q. Where did that conversation take place ?
A. I think it was probably in Mr. Aldridge's office, or it
might have been in my office, or it might have been on the
street. I do not recall that at this time. But he told me that
he was about to complete the building of the barn; and I
solicited the fire insurance on the barn, the equipment, and
the horses; and at that time he said he thought he would give
me the fire insurance on the dwelling, which was
page 44 also down there, and that he would let me know
in the next two or three days; and I wrote this
policy for him on the barn and the equipment, and went back
to see him in a couple of days and asked him about the dwell-
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ing; and he said he was sony he could not give it to me; that
his daughtei* and son-in-law were living there, and that they
wanted to place it with some one else. That is about all that
liappened then. There was no other conversation that I can
recall.
Q. Will you please state whether you knew at that time
"that that cottage dwelling, or any portion of that land, includ
ing the land on which the barn was built, did not stand, in
fee simple title, in the name of Mr. Aldridge?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did he at any time tell you so?
A. No, sir, he never told me anything about the ownership
of the property. The only thing he said was that he bought
the property. I recall hmi saying that; that he had pur
chased the property. But I never knew of any other owner
until after the fire.
Q. It has been testified here, Mr. Bulifant, by two Avitnesses
who testified in your absence, namely, Mr. Aldridge and Mr.
IMcGee, that, in the City of Petersburg, at the office of the
Cab Company, which was then being conducted by Mr. Mc-
Gee right across the hall from Mr. Aldridge's office, on Sun
day, the 13th of September, 1942, you were in Mr. McGee's
office, and that Mr. Aldridge came in there, and
page 45 that you asked him for the Insurance on the barn,
and that he told you that that was all right, but
that he did not know whether you could insure that bam on
the property because the title was in his daughter's name;
and that he asked you if he could insure that barn under those
circumstances ?
Mr. Cole: I object. It is leading. He is entitled to ask
Ml*. Bulifant if he was present at a certain time and place;
and Mr. Bulifant can say Yes or No; and then he can ask him
if he was there. But he cannot ask this question in the form
in which it is.
The Court: This is in rebuttal of previous testimony. The
objection is overruled.
A. The question as to whether the policy could be written
in that way was never asked me. I never kne^v of any other
owner than Mr. Kirk P. Aldridge. I never questioned him as
to the ownership of the property.
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
L. W. T. Bulifant.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mr. Bulifant, I understood you to say that you had some
conversation with Mr. Aldridge on the street in Petersburg:
relative to this insurance. Is that correct ?
A. Yes, sir. I do not know whether it was relative to the
liability insurance or the insurance on tlie barn and contents.
Q. Was that the only conversation you had witli him with,
regard to insurance?
page 46 ^ A. No, sir, I have approximately five policies
with him.
Q. Then you have had other conversations with Mr. Ald
ridge on the subject of insurance?
X Well, at or previous to that time I talked with him
with reference to two policies, and there was a lapse of time
before I sold him any more insurance, for approximately four
months.
Q. And I understood you to say that Mr, Aldridge subse
quently told you that he could not place the policy of insur
ance on the dwelling house because his daughter desired to
place it elsewhere ?
A. He told me that he thought he would give me the insur-^
ance on the dwelling there, and that he would let me know in
the next two or three days; and then, when I contacted him
again, he said he was sorry, but that his son-in-law and daugh
ter were living there and that they wanted to place it some
where else; and that he had agreed to do that.
Q. How many conversations had you had with Mr. Aldridge
on the subject of insurance?
A. Three or four times. I do not know exactly.
Q. You are not sure how many conversations you had with
him?
A. Well, I used to see him up there practically all of the
time, but I did not discuss insurance with him every time I
saw him.
Q. But you had a number of conversations with him?
A. Yes, sir, three or four,
page 47 }■ Q. But you are not sure how many you had?
A. I will say three or four.
EE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
Mr. Sands: If your Honor please, I would like the privi
lege of asking this question, and, if Mr. Cole objects to it, I
ask a ruling on it:
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Q. Mr. Bulifant, liave you liad any difficulty with Mr. Mc-
Gee about any business matters ?
Mr. Cole: I object to the question as being entirely too
vague and indefinite.
.The Court: Make it a little more clear.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Have you and Mr. McGee had any dispute about any
business matters, which you are engaged in, which has re
sulted in any litigation?
A. Yes, sir. We were together in the business of the Hill
Top Cab Company; and there is now a case in the Chancery
Court of the City of Petersburg of himself against me.
Q. Which has not been decided ?
A. No, sir, not that I know of.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mr. Bulifant, is that suit, to which you refer, a suit for
an accounting of the business transactions of the Hill Top
Cab Company?
A. I do not know much about the legal part of a suit of that
sort. I understand that there has been an account-
page 48 ing of the business. That is as far as I know. I
have an attorney, Mr. Mann, who is looking after
it for nie.
Witness stood aside.
page 49 } MRS. LOUISE D. GIBSON.,
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
Bj"- Mr. Sands:
Q. What is your name?
Answer: Mrs. Louise D. Gibson.
Q. What relation are you to !Mr. Aldridge, the plaintiff
here ?
A. He is my father.
Q. Where do you live?
A. I live at Stop 8 on the Hopewell Road.
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Q. Will you please state whether or not the title to that
property stands in your name?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. When did you get it, and how ? '
A. My father gave it to me in July, 1942, I think it was.
Q. Will you please state whether or not you had any under
standing with him that he could live there for his lifetime,
or that he had any interest in the place?
A. No, but I told him if he ever needed a home he could
come there at any time. He gave me the place.
Q. Was that after or before he gave you the property?
A. That was before. And I told him he could come there
at any time.
Q. Did he make any demand upon you to deed any property
to him, and, if so, when?
A. It was in June of last year. He asked me to deed the
lot hack to him—the lot in the back where the barn was.
Q. And what did you tell him ?
page 50 A. And I told him. No, I had rather not do that.
Q. And you did not do it?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you have any conversation or argument with him
at that time in reference to his re-marriage?
A. No.
Q. Did he come to jmu, or how did that conversation take
place Avhen he made that request for the deed to the lot?
A. He came to me and asked me if I would deed that lot
hack to him; and I said I had rather not do it, hut that he
could use it as long as he wanted to.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cole:
Q. Mrs. Gibson, you consented to the erection of the barn
there, did you not?
A. My father did not ask me about that. He took it for
granted that it would be all right. And I had no objection.
Q. You had no objection to the erection of the barn?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. You still lived in the house at the time of the fire?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far away was the house from the barn?
A. I am not so good at judging distances.
Q. As close as twenty feet?
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A. I do not think it was that close.
Q. Are you on good terms with your father now?
page 51 }• A. Well, we have had a little argument, and he
hasn't come back to the house.
Q. Have you consulted a lawyer regarding your claim to
the proceeds of the insurance policy ?
A. No.
Q. Has your husband consulted a lawyer about that?
A. He asked Mr. Early to come up here and look into the
case for him.
Q. As a matter of fact, hasn't he been to other lawyers in
Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you been to see Mr. Watkins Booth, an attorney in
Petei'sburg?
A. I do not know him.
Q. And wasn't it with the idea of collecting the insurance
himself?
A. I am not sure whether he did or not. He can tell you
about that.
Q. As a matter of fact, you and your father are not on
good terms at all, are you?
A. AYell, in a way we are. After he asked me for the place
back, and I did not consent to it, he hasn't come around.
Q. He gave you the place?
A. Yes.
Q. And funiished it for you?
A. That is I'ight.
Witness stood aside.
page 52 }■ C. M. GIBSON,
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. What is your name?
Answer: C.M.Gibson.
Q. And you work for whom?
A. The Norfolk &' Western Railroad.
Q. Were you present when anjr conversation was had be
tween your wife and your father-in-law in respect to the own
ership of this lot?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there any conditions or strings tied to it, except
those expressed.by the deed?
A. None at all, except that her fatlier, at my wife's request,,
had it understood that my wife should not dispose of the
place as long as he lived.
Q. That is the only tiling he asked ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you present at any time when he attempted to
have a conveyance of a part of that property back to him?
A. No, sir, I was not then in their presence.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Colo:
Q., Mr. Gibson, what lawyer have you consulted with refer
ence to the barn?
Mr. Sands: I do not understand the question.
Witness: I do not either.
page 53 }• By Mr. Cole:
Q, You know that there is a policy of insurance
on the barn ?
A. I do.
Q. You consulted Mr. Watkins Booth, an attorney in Pe
tersburg, relative to the insurance on the barn, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was to find out whether you could collect it




Q. Did you employ him?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did he give you an opinion?
A. Yes, sir, he did. He told me that he did not think that
I had any grounds.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Sands: Now, if your Honor please, I want to introduce
that deed in evidence. It is in Deed Book 122, at page 247.
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The Court: It may be done by filing in the record a certi
fied copy.
Mr. Sands: Yes, sir.
The Court: That may be done at the recess hour.
(Certified copy of deed subsequently furnished),
page 54 }■ Eecess until 1:15 P. M.
JOHN H. OLSEN,
.sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Sands:
Q. Please state your name and residence?
Answer: John H. Olsen; residence, Dinwiddie County, Vir
ginia.
Q. Whereabouts in Dinwiddie do you live?
A. Six miles out of Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. Is that on Highway No. 1?
A. Yes,, sir.
0. You own a farm, don't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How large a farm?
A. ].56 acres.
Q. And then you also have a restaurant and a filling sta
tion ?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Did you opei'ate both the farm and the filling station
last summer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know Mr. Kirk P. Aldridge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did von have any business dealings with Mr. Kirk P.
Aldridge during the spring of 1943, with reference to horses?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What business did you have with him?
page 55 ) A. J bought a couple of horses from him.
Q. Did you ever keep any horses for him before
you bought those horses?
A. Yes, sir, he had them, and he brought them out thei'e
for me to keep for a while, just to have somewhere to put
them.
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John H. Olsen.
Q. What use did you have for them out there?
A. Not any. I was just keeping them for him.
Q. You did not conduct any business with him for hiring
horses?
A. No, sir.
Q. How long were the horses out there with you?
A. About a month.
Q. Wlien was that ?
A. Along about June they were brought there, and they
wore taken away in July.
Q. Did you buy any horses from him?
A. Yes, sir, two.
Q. Did you give him a note for those horses?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Wliat did you pay for them!
A. I think it was $175.00 in all.
Q. And what was that for?
A. For some saddles and two horses.
Q. And did you give him a note for a part of it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the amount of the note?
page 56} A. I do not remember exactly. It was about
$100.00.
Q. And did you buy that note back from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What discount did you buy it back at?
A. He gave me a little discount; I think it was about $30.00.
Q. And you were glad to get the discount?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was that in the summer too ?
A. Yes, sir, pretty soon after that first transaction.
Mr. Cole: If your Honor please, I object to this line of
questions. I do not see that it is material in any way what
soever to the issues involved in this case.
The Court: I think, Mr. Sands, you are goinsr a little far
afield.
Mr. Sands: Your Honor, I was under the impression that
Mr. Aldridge said that there was no discount given, and that
he did not buy this note in; that no such transaction took
place.
The Court: Mr. Reporter, read what 3klr. Aldridge said
about that.
(Record on the point read.)
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George B. Walters.
The Court: The objection is overruled, and the testimony




page 57 ilr. Sands: I would like to put in the deed at
this time.
'  GEOEGE R. WALTERS,
Tsworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Sands:
Q- Mr. Walters, you are Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Prince George County!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. !Mr. Walters, I would like for you to read the deed from
the record Book; and a certified copy of it will he put in the
evidence?
A. (Producing original record book) This is Deed Book
122, page 247. It is a deed from Estelle L. Holloway and C.
S. Holloway, her husband, parties of the first part, to Louise
Dunford Gibson, party of tlie second part (reading) :
page 58 ) Certified copy of deed marked Exhibit No. 3 and
filed in evidence, and is attached.
Witness stood aside.
Testimony closed.
page 59 }■ (Out of the presence of the jury.)
Mr. Sands: Now, if your Honor please, I desire to renew
the motion which I made this morning, that the plaintiff's
evidence he stricken, for the reasons therein staled, namely,
those arising under the forfeiture for vacancy clause, consid
ering the state of the record.
And I also move that the plaintiff's evidence be stricken
for the further reason: the testimony having disclosed beyond
question that the insured building was located upon ground
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not owned by the insured in fee simple; and that the said,
motion should he granted for this reason also; in view of the-
present state of the record, according to the testimony as in
troduced.-
The Court: The motions are overruled; and exceptions-
may he noted.
Mr. Sands: "VVe note an exception. And privilege is given;
counsel to supply those reasons stated in the record?
The Court: Yes,
Mr. Sands: Therefore, I move that your Honor will at this-
time sustain the motion made this morning, viewing the same
as of the status of the record at that time.
And also that your Honor grant the motion to strike, both
for the reasons assigned this morning and that just stated.
The Court: The motions are overruled, at this time.
Mr. Sands: And exception is noted to each.
page 60 I The following are all of the instructions given r
I.
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant company
issued policy No. 1057 to the plaintiff, in consideration of the
premium paid by him, and that the plaintiff was the owner
of the barn described in the said policy, which barn was de
stroyed by fire while the policy was still in force, and that the
defendant's agent, L. W. -T. Bulifant, was informed by the
plaintiff on September 13, 1942, that tlae barn was on ground
which was not owned by the plaintiff in fee simple, and that
no change took place in the interest and title of the plaintiff
to the barn between the time of the issuance of the policy
and the date of the fire, except a change in occupancy, you
should find for the plaintiff for such amount as you believe
from the evidence was his loss and damage, not exceeding the
sum of $1,000,00, with interest from November 20,1943.
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof, and must establish his case by a preponder
ance of the evidence.
The Court further instructs the jury that the requirement
that the plaintiff must prove his case by a pre-
page 61 ponderance of the evidence has to do with the
weight of evidence, and if after the jury considers
all of the evidence in the case, both the evidence for the plain-
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tiff and evidence for the defendant, including all circum
stances as well as direct testimony, and from all this the jury
believes that the evidence in favor of the plaintiff outweighs
tliat of the defendant, then this requirement as to the burden
of pi'oof on the plaintiff is fully met.
A.
The Court instructs the jury that it is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove by a fair preponderance of evidence each
and every allegation contained in the notice of motion, except
such as liave not been controverted by the defendant, and the
jury are instructed that in no event would the plaintiff be
entitled to recover more than the actual cash value of the
])roperty alleged to have been destroyed, immediately pre
ceding the fire, and the burden of proving such value with
reasonable certainty rests upon the plaintiff.
B.
The Court instructs the jury that under the evidence be
fore you in this case it is established that the building de
stroyed by fire, mentioned in the insurance policy under which,
this action is brought,, was situated on ground not owned by
the insured in fee simple; and if you believe from
page 62 the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, Ald
ridge, failed or neglected to infonn the defendant's
agent, Bulifant, as to the state of such title at the time he
applied for the issuance of the policy of insurance, then you
shall find for the defendant.
OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS:
Mr. Sands: The defendant objects and excepts to Instruc
tion No. 1, as granted on behalf of the plaintiff, upon the fol
lowing grounds:
1. That the insti'uction, being what is termed a finding in
struction, is erroneous in that it does not state the converse
from the defendant's standpoint; and,
2. That the instruction is improper, in that it fails to take
cognizance of the fact that the sole testimony proffered bv
the plaintiff in order to establish notice to defendant's agent,
Bulifant, was not shown to have been given as to the time
and place and under conditions under which' such informa
tion, if true, would constitute a notice of the alleged waiver
so far as the defendant is concerned.
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And the instruction having been given, the defendant moves
that the following addendum be added thereto, namely, after
the figures '*'1943" the following, "but the jury are further
instructed that, if the preponderance of the evidence fails
to establish to their satisfaction that the said Buli-
page 63 }• fant was so informed of the true status of the title
of the land upon which insured building was lo
cated, they should find in favor of the defendant."
The defendant objects and excepts to the giving of the in
struction in the form given, for the reasons stated, and the
refusal of the Court to amend the instruction as suggested,
for the reasons stated.
Mr. Cole: The plaintiff objects and excepts to Instruction
A of the defendant, on the ground that it is not incumbent
upon the plaintitT to prove bv a preponderance of the evi
dence each and every allegation contained in the notice of
motion, except such as have not been controverted by the de
fendant, for the reason that it is not incumbent on the plaintitT
to establish each and every allegation e.xcept such as have
not been controverted. Tlie burden is on the defendant to
show the breach of any condition in the policy, including
ownership and vacancy.
The plaintitT further objects and excepts to the instruc
tion with reference to the amount of the recoveiy, because
there is no evidence, except the imcontroverted evidence of
the plaintitT that the barn was worth $1,200.00 at the time
of the fire, and that it would have cost that much to have
replaced it.
page 64 }■ Instruction tendered and requested by the plain
tiff, and refused:
The Court instimcts the jury that the law only requires
from an insured person a substantial and not necessarily a
literal compliance with the requirements of his policy, and
if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case
substantially complied with the requirements of the policy
sued on, then you should find for the plaintiff.
And on the same day, to-wit, March 2, 1944, the trial of
the case proceeded:
And having heard the evidence introduced on behalf of the
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plaintiff, the defendant, by counsel, thereupon moved the
Court to strike the evidence on the ground that the evidence
disclosed as a matter of law that the entire policy on which
tills action is based is void and cannot be enforced for the rea-
.son that the building insured at the time of the fire was and
had been vacant or unoccupied beyond the period
page 65 of time pennitted under the terms and conditions
of said policy, of which the company had no no
tice; and the Court, having beard argument of counsel on
said motion., doth overrule the same for the time being, to
which action of the Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted.
Whereupon evidence was introduced on behalf of the defend
ant, and, at the conclusion of said evidence, defendant, by
counsel, renewed its said motion to sti'ike the evidence on the
same grounds heretofore assigned at the conclusion of the
evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff. And the Court,
not being advised as to its ruling on said motion, reserved
decision thereon and submitted the case to the jury upon
other issues involved; and thereupon, the jury having been
instructed by the Court and having heard argument of coun
sel, retired to consider of their verdict, and after some time
returned into court with a verdict as follows:
"We the jury find for the plaintiff. Kirk P. Aldridge and
fix his damages at ,000.00, with interest thereon from No
vember 20,1943.
C. E. DISE, Foreman."
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to
set aside the verdict of the jury and enter up judgment in
favor of the defendant, upon the grounds heretofore assigned
by it in its two motions to strike the evidence, and further
to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant it a new trial
on the groiinds that said verdict is contrary to the
page 66 law and evidence, and for error committed by the
Court in giving instructions at the instance of the
plaintiff over the objection of the defendant, and refusing to
give certain instructions at the instance of the defendant, and
in amending instructions asked for by the defendant over the
objection of said defendant.
Whereupon the Court set down for argument on Saturday,
March 4th, at W o'clock A. M., the defendant's motion to set
aside the verdict of the jury and enter up judgment for the
defendant on the grounds assigned by the defendant in its
two motions to strike the evidence, and doth continue the de-
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feiidant's motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and
grant a new trial on the other grounds assigned in said mo
tion.
And on another day, to-wit, March 4, 1944, the following
transpired:
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys,, and
the Court having lieard argument of counsel on the motion
set down for argument on this day, and the plaintiff' by coun
sel, having requested permission to file a brief and memoran
dum of authority, this case is further continued to a date to»
be hereafter fixed.
page 67 ^ And on another day, to-wit, March 28,1944, final
order was entered as follows:
This day came again the parties, by tlieir attorneys., and
the Court having heard arg-ument on the defendant's motion,
made herein on March 2,1944, and set for argument on March
4, 1944, and on that day continued, as from the orders en
tered herein on said dates doth appear, and having maturely
considered said motion, the Court being of opinion that the
evidence in this case discloses as a matter of law that the
barn insured by tlic policy of insurance on which this action
is based, was vacant and unoccupied at the time it was de
stroyed by fire, and had been vacant and unoccupied for a
longer period than is permitted by the terms of said policy,
and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any-
tliing of the defendant, doth so decide. And the- Court doth,
accordingly, adjudge and order that the verdict of the jury
returned herein on March 2,1944, be, and the same is hereby,
set aside, and that the plaintiff.. Kirk P. Aldridge, and Kirk
P. Aldridge, trading as Aldridge Riding Stables, take noth
ing of the defendant, Piedmont Fire Insurance Company,
but for his false clamor be in mercy, etc., and that the defend
ant, Piedmont Fire Insurance Company, do recover of the
plaintiff.,. Kirk P. Aldridge, and Kirk P. Aldridge,
page 68 trading as Aldridge Riding Stables, its costs by it
in this behalf expended; to which action of the
Court the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted.
And the plaintiff, Ijy counsel, having intimated his inten
tion of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
for. a writ of error from and snnersedeas to the aforesaid
judgment, on motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, execution of
said judgment is suspended for ninety days from this date.
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and thereafter until a petition of the plaintiff for a writ of
error from and supersedeas to said judgment is acted on by
the Supreme Court of Appeals, provided such petition is filed
within said ninety days, and provided the said plaintiff, or
some one for him shall within twenty days from this date
enter into bond in the clerk's office of this court with surety
to be approved by said clerk, in the penalty of $100.00, condi
tioned and payable as the law directs.
Mr. Cole: The plaintiff excepts to the foregoing order, on
the grounds that a described building was not vacant or un
occupied within the meaning of the terms of the policy; and,
in the alternative, that the so-called vacancy provision does
not apply to this case at all; or that the vacancy provision
applies to the dwelling on the premises and not to the barn,
and that the evidence shows that such dwelling was occupied;
and that, even if the vacancy provision applies to
page 69 the barn, the burden of showing vacancy is on the
defendant, and the evidence does not show as a
matter of law that the barn was vacant or unoccupied.
Memorandum by Clerk: The suspending bond, required
by order of March 28, 1944, was duly executed and filed on
April 6, 1944.
page 70 }• I, J. J. Temple, .Judge of the Circuit Court of
Prince George County, Virginia, who presided
over the foregoing trial, do certify that the foregoing is a
true transcript of the stenographic record and other incidents
of the trial of the above styled case of Ivirk P. Aldridge and
Kirk P. Aldridgc, trading as Aldridge Riding Stables, plain
tiff. V. Piedmont Fire Tjisurance Company, defendant, tried
in the Circuit Court of Prince George County on the 2nd day
of ^ lareli, 1944, and other days herein mentioned; and I fur
ther certify that the attorney for the defendant had reason-
."ble notice, in writinc', of the time and place when said report
of the testimony and other incidents of the said trial would
be tendered and presented to me for verification; and I fur
ther certify that, at the request of attorney for the plaintiff
in error I have certified and foi-warded to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia the following original
exhibits, namely:
Exhibit No. 1, lieing Policy No. 1057, of Piedmont Fire In
surance Companv, issued September 2.3, 1942.
Exhibit No. 2, being proof of loss, September 20,1943.
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Exhibit No. 3, being deed from Estelle L. and C. S. Hollo-
way to Louise Dunford Gibson, dated July 2,1942.
Given under my band this 27th day of April, 1944.
J. J. TEMPLE,
Judge.
page 71 }• I, George R. Walters, Clerk of the Circuit Court
of the County of Prince George., Virginia, do here
by certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record
and proceedings in the trial of the above styled case of Kirk
P. Aldridge and Kirk P. Aldridge, trading as Aldridge Rid
ing Stables, plaintiff, v. Piedmont Fire Insurance Company,
defendant, tried in the Circuit Court of Prince George County
on the 2nd day of Ikfarch, 1944, and other days herein men
tioned, with all things touching the same as fully and wholly
as they now exist among the records in mv office; and I fur
ther certify that the attorney for the plaintiff duly notified
the attorney for the defendant of his intention to apply for
a transcript of the record in said case, as provided by the
Code of Virginia.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this
27th day of April, 1944.
GEORGE R. WALTERS,
Clerk.
Fee for this transcript $58.70.
A Copy—Teste:
M. B. WATTS, C. C.
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1. Form and contents of appellant's brief. The opening brief of the appellant (or
the petition for appeal when adopted as the opening brief) shall contain:
r- ^ subject index and table of citations with cases alphabetically arranged.Citations of Virginia cases must refer to the Virginia Reports and, in addition, may
refer to other reports containing such cases.
_(b) A brief statement of tiic material proceedings in the lower court, the errors
assigned, and the questions involved in the appeal.(c) A clear and concise statement of the facts, with references to the pages of
tlie record where there is any possibility that the other side may question the state
ment. Where the facts are controverted it should be so slated.
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellant.
_ The brief shall be signed by at least one attorney practicing in this court, giving
hts address.
The appellant may adopt the petition for appeal as his opening brief by so stating
In the petition, or by giving to opposing counsel written notice of such intention
within five days of the receipt by appellant of the printed record, and by filing a
copy of such notice with the clerk of the court. No alleged error not specified in t!ie
opening brief or petition for appeal .shall be admitted as a ground for argument by
appellant on the hearing of llie cause.
2. Form and contents of appellee's brief. Tlie brief for the appellee shall contain:
(a) A subject index and table of citations with cases alphabetically arranged.
Citations of Virginia cases must refer to the Virginia Reports and, in addition, may
refer to other reports containing such cases.
(b) A statement of tlie case and of the points involved, if the appellee disagrees
with the statement of appellant.
(c) A statement of the facts which are necessary to correct or amplify the state
ment in appellant's brief in so far as it is deemed erroneous or inadequate, with ap
propriate reference to the pages of the record.
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellee.
The brief sliall be signed by at least one attorney practicing in this court, giving
his address.
3. Reply brief. The reply brief (if any) of the appellant shall contain all the au
thorities relied on by him, not referred to in his petition or opening brief. In other
respects it shail conform to the requirements for aiipellce's brief.
4. Time of filing, (a) Civil cases. The opening brief of the appellant (if there be
one in addition to the petition for appeal) shall be filed in the clerk's office within
fifteen days after the receipt by counsel for appellant of the printed record, but in no
event less than twenty-five days before the first day of (he session at whicli the case
is to be heard. The brief of the appellee shall be filed in the clerk's office not later
than ten clays before the first day of the session at which tlie case is to be heard. The
reply brief of the ajipellant shall be filed in the clerk'.s office not later than the day
before the first day of the session at wliich the case is to be beard.
(b) Criminal Cases. In criminal cases briefs must be filed witliin the time specified
in civil cases; provided, liowcver, that in those casc.s in which the records have not
been printed and delivered to counsel at least twenty-five day.s before the beginning
of the next session of the court, such case.s shall be placed at tlie foot of the docket
for tliat session of tlie court, and the Comnionwcaltli's brief shall be filed at least ten
days prior to the calling of the case, and the reply brief for tlie plainlitT in error not
later tlian the clay before the case is called.
(c) SHpulaiion of counsel as to ftUnij. Counsel for opposing parlies may file with
the clerk a written stipulation changing the lime for filing briefs in any case; pro
vided. however, that all briefs must be filed not later than the day before such case
is to be heard.
5. Number of copies to be filed and delivered to opposing counsel. Twenty copies
of each brief sliall be filed witli the clerk of the court, and at least two copies mailed
or delivered to opposing counsel on or before the day on which the brief is filed.
6. Size and Type. Briefs shall be nine inche.s in length and six inciies in width, so
as to conform in dimensions to the printed record, and shall be printed in type not less
In size, as to height and width, than the type in which the record is printed. The
record number of the case and names of counsel shall be printed on tlie front cover of
all briefs.
7. Non-compliance, effect of. The clerk of this court ts directed not to receive or
file a brief which fails to comply with tlie requirements of this rule. If neither side
has filed a proper brief the cause will not be heard. If one of the parties fails to file
a proper brief he can not be heard, but the case will be heard ca parte upon the argu»
ment of the party by whom the brief lias been filed.
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